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Abstract
There are currently two schools of thought that seek to explain the persistence of political violence in
Northern Ireland, one with a sociopolitical focus and the other with an economic focus. Expanding on past
economic theory, this paper utilizes several multiple regression models to test the applicability of the
economic school's relative deprivation theory in the fifteen years since the Troubles were formally ended with
the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. The basis of this theory is that as economic conditions worsen in a
given area, the number of acts of political violence should also increase. This study specifically looked at the
effects of a rising unemployment rate and its relationship to political violence. While no such relationship
could be observed, there was a statistically significant relationship between Gross Domestic Household
Income and the number of acts of political violence, which supports relative deprivation theory. These
findings imply that policymakers in Northern Ireland should focus their efforts not on reducing the
unemployment rate but rather on increasing the average level of income.
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VICIOUS CYCLE OR BUSINESS CYCLE?: EXPLAINING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN 
NORTHERN IRELAND AFTER THE TROUBLES 
Lauren Burke 
Abstract: Tbere aI. CIImntIY tivo sebools of tbollgbt tbat seek to explain tbe persistence of political violence in 
Nortbe", Irelant/, one Ivitb a sociopolitical foclls and tbe other Ivith an economic foclls. Expanding on past economic 
tbeary, this paper lItilizes several mllitiple ,.gmsion models to test tbe applicability of the economic school's rei alive 
deprivation theory in the fifteen years since the T rolfbles Ivere foro/allY ettded Ivith tbe signing of the Good Friday 
Agreement. Tbe basis of this theory is that as economic conditions Ivorsen in a given area, the llumber rf acts 0/ 
political violettce shollld also increase. This stutjy specificallY looked at the efficts of a lising II11"'pIOYlllet1t rate and its 
relationship to political violmce. !l7bile 110 slfcb "lationship could be obsemet/, there IVas a statisticallY significant 
relationship betlvml Gross DOlllestic HOllsebold II/conle and the nllmber of acts ofpolitical violence, Ivhieb SIlPPOlts 
"Iative deprivation theory. These findings ilIpIY that policymakers Iii Northem II.land should foclls their ejfiJlts not on 
reducing the IlIlemplq;lJlle1lt rate bill ratber 011 increasiNg the average level cif income. 
INTRODUCTION 
From 1969 to 1998, the ethnonationalist conflict in Northern Ireland called the Troubles 
was "easily the most intense violent conflict in Europe."39 More than three thousand people lost 
their lives and approximately three percent of the population sustained some form of physical 
injury.4o Although the level of politically motivated violence has subsided considerably since the 
signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, it continues on a smaller scale to this day. 
Building on past research on the connection between economic conditions and political 
violence, the goal of this study was to determine whether or not the unemployment rate had an effect 
on political violence in Northern Ireland in the fifteen-year period following the Good Friday 
Agreement. Conventional wisdom seems to be that a reduction in the unemployment rate will lead 
to a decrease in the level of political violence, and several prominent scholars and policymakers hold 
this belief. In the wake of the Unionist protests that began last December in Belfast, determining 
whether or not this perceived connection is supported by statistical evidence would allow the 
government to pursue policies that hinder the growth of hostile movements. 
This study utilized several multiple regression models controlling for various economic and 
political factors in order to isolate the effects of the unemployment rate on political violence and 
thereby test the hypothesis that as the unemployment rate increases, the number of politically 
motivated acts of violence will also increase. None of the various regression models found a 
significant correlation between the unemployment rate and the number of politically motivated acts 
of violence in Northern Ireland. However, political violence did show a significant correlation with 
one control variable: annual Gross Disposable Household Income (GDHI). This fInding suggests 
that although unemployment is not a significant predictor of political violence, other factors 
39 Hayes and McAllister 2005, 599 
40 Hayes and McAllister 2005 
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impacting the economic health of the country do make a difference. The correlation between GDHI 
and violence also lends support to the relative deprivation theory and suggests that further study of 
the impact of other economic variables on political violence would be a worthwhile investment, both 
for policymakers in the U.K. and for economic and political theorists in other post-industrialized 
conflict areas. 
ROOTS OF VIOLENCE: LANDLORDS, FENIANISM, AND THE BORDER QUESTION 
Today, Northern Ireland is fairly evenly divided between the primarily Catholic Nationalists 
and the primarily Protestant Loyalists. The term Nationalist has been used interchangeably with the 
term Republican due to this group's desire to incorporate the six Northern Irish counties into the 
current Republic of Ireland, thereby uniting the entire island of Ireland to form a thirty-two-county 
Republic. On the other side of the conflict are the Loyalists, often called Unionists because they 
wish to remain a part of the United Kingdom and are vehemently against the proposed change. 
These mutually exclusive goals are deeply rooted in the groups' cultural, religious, and political 
histories. 
The Catholic minority in Northern Ireland, typically of native Irish descent, was for centuries 
at a relative disadvantage compared to the Protestant majority, who often trace their ancestry back to 
the British settlers who colonized the island. As the Tudors, and subsequently Oliver Cromwell, 
attempted to impose the new Anglican Church upon their unwilling Irish subjects, they confiscated 
land from Irish Catholics and reallocated it to loyal British Protestants.4! These new landlords 
established large plantations and enforced discriminatory policies that barred Catholics from 
participating in Parliament.42 The Great Potato Famine from 1845 to 1849 exacerbated tensions 
between Catholic peasants and the mostly Protestant landlords:' who developed a reputation for 
evicting or otherwise mistreating their starving tenants." The famine's legacy along with continued 
denial of political power to Catholics made many view Great Britain as an unwelcome, imperialist 
power. It was this perception that gave rise to Fenianism: the revolutionary, nationalist movement 
aimed at achieving Irish independence. 
More moderate, nonviolent political actors attempted to achieve autonomy by pushing for 
Home Rule, a policy that would have allowed Ireland to have its own Parliament separate from 
Westminster.45 The movement met its fiercest opposition in the heavily Protestant Ulster province, 
which includes the six counties that today constitute Northern Ireland. It was out of this opposition 
41 Toomey 2013 
42 Holwell 1997 
43 Feeney, "Parnellism and Home Rule" 
44 Donnelly 2011 
45 Feeney, "Parnellism and Home Rule" 
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that the Unionist movement was born. 46 At the conclusion of the Anglo-Irish War, the six counties 
of Northern Ireland were the only ones that established a Home Rule government; the rest of the 
island was granted Free State status and, ultimately, independence.47 
By intentionally partitioning Ireland in a manner that guaranteed a Protestant majority, the 
British created conditions that generated conflict. While the new Irish Free State was overwhelmingly 
Catholic and therefore protected the Catholics' rights, the Protestant majority in the North ensured 
that the interests of the Catholic population were never sufficiently addressed and that systematic 
discrimination against them continued.48 Unionists not only dominated the police force, the civil 
service, and local government, but they also enjoyed job and housing options that were denied to 
Catholics. This imbalance persisted until the 1960s, when Catholics inspired by the American Civil 
Rights Movement attempted to draw attention to their struggles through participation in peaceful 
protests. These protests evoked strong Unionist backlash and, to prevent violence, the government 
banned all political demonstrations in an effort to prevent rioting. On October 5, 1968, Irish 
Catholics defied one such ban in the city of Derry and were met with a violent response from the 
Unionist-dominated Royal Ulster Constabulary.4' This highly publicized incident is considered by 
many to be the starting date of what have been euphemistically termed the Troubles. For the next 
thirty years, Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries engaged in a "Dirty War" that claimed the lives of 
more than three thousand people, most of them civilians. 50 Fighting between the major paramilitary 
organizations was officially ended by the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, although radical splinter 
groups continue to commit acts of political violence to this day. The focus of this study will be 
determining which factors are driving the violent actions of these new organizations. 
EXPLANATIONS FOR THE USE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
The Sociopolitical Explanation 
Social science explanations for political violence in Northern Ireland fall into two main 
schools of thought: the sociopolitical explanation and the economic explanation. The sociopolitical 
explanation contends that political violence in Northern Ireland occurs because the two major 
ethnonationalist groups in the region continue to view their interests as mutually exclusive. Although 
they constitute a majority in Northern Ireland, the Unionists are in fact a minority on the island of 
Ireland as a whole. According to incorporation theory,51 also known as the "see-sa\v" theory,52 each 
group's minority status makes it feel insecure. As a result, each group tends to view the political 
46 Feeney, "A Deepening Crisis" 
47 Feeney, "Achieving Freed om: Ireland 1921-39" 
48 Feeney, "Northern Ireland , 1920-98" 
49 Melaugh 2013 
50 Melaugh 2013 
51 Thompson 1989 
52 Maney 2005 
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advancement of the other as a threat to its own security and tries to assert its own power by 
responding violendy to the enemy's political victories. Exposure to political violence leads to an 
acceptance of violence ,vithin these communities, perpetuating a cycle of attacks and retributive 
action that some expect to continue indefInitely.53 In essence, proponents of this view believe that 
the only way to forge a lasting peace is by maintaining that peace for long enough that it becomes the 
new norm. 
The Ecollomic Explallatioll 
The economic explanation seeks to refIne this belief in a never-ending cycle of violence and 
argues that spikes in the level of paramilitary activity are correlated with economic conditions. One 
of the most studied factors by proponents of this theory has been the unemployment rate. Northern 
Ireland has suffered from relatively high unemployment compared to the rest of the United 
Kingdom,54 and it is widely believed by both scholars and policymakers that unemployment is an 
underlying cause of political violence.55 Proponents of this theory argue that the unemployed have a 
tendency to blame society for their hardships and-more disturbingly-to express greater support 
for "violent change" to the political system.56 However, others have found negative correlations 
between unemployment rate and violence,57 attributed to the increased political apathy of the 
unemployed58 or the increasing scarcity of resources available to terrorist organizations.59 
The most relevant economic theories to the Northern Itish case are the relative deptivation 
theory and the power-conflict variant of deprivation theory. Relative deptivation theory states that if 
there is a "gap between expected and achieved welfare" for a population, they are likely to express 
their frustration violendy.'O In the context of the Troubles, this theory would imply that the high 
unemployment rate for all citizens led to an "equality of misery"61 that exacerbated the underlying 
sociopolitical conflict and led to the Troubles. 
Although results of studies working under this assumption failed to find any positive 
correlation between the unemployment rate and violence,62 some scholars have argued that this 
occurred because economic hardships were not equally distributed." In the 1970s, census data 
53 McAloney et al. 2009; Hayes and McAllister 2001 
54 Thompson 1989 
55 Hewitt 1984; Thompson 1989 
56 Breakwell 1986 
57 Berman et al. 2011 
58 Breakwell 1986 
59 Berman et al. 2011 
60 Thompson 1989, 677 
61 Thompson 1989, 681 
62 Thompson 1989; White 1993 
63 Honaker 2004; Maney 2005 
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showed that the unemployment rate for Catholics was more than twice the rate for Protestants.64 
Because the Catholics were economically worse off than the Protestant majority during the Troubles, 
their comparative disadvantage may have driven them to participate in violent Republican 
movements. This hypothesis reflects the "power-conflict" variant of deprivation theory,65 which 
states that a group's absolute economic status is a less significant predictor of its likelihood to 
respond violently than its economic status relative to other segments of the population. Empirical 
studies of fluctuations in the unemployment rate during the Troubles found that higher 
unemployment was positively correlated with acts of Republican paramilitary violence but not with 
Loyalist violence," and although separate unemployment data for Catholics and Protestants is 
unavailable, when these values are estimated, high Catholic unemployment was correlated with 
increased Republican violenceP 
Since the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, the socioeconomic gap between Catholics and 
Protestants has narrowed considerably.68 Data from the 2011 Census show a 3 percent gap in the 
unemployment rate of Protestants and Catholics,6'J suggesting that the anti-discrimination measures 
of the Good Friday Agreement have in fact improved the employment prospects of members of the 
Catholic community. The fact that political violence persists in Northern Ireland despite the 
decreasing gap in the unemployment rates of these groups suggests that while the power-conflict 
variant of deprivation theory might have explained political violence during the Troubles, it does not 
explain the persistence of violence in the post-Good Friday Agreement period. If a correlation 
between unemployment and violence persists as expected, this would suggest that the relative 
deprivation theory, with its focus on the overall unemployment rate rather than on the unequal 
treatment of Catholics and Protestants, would be applicable to this case. More broadly, this would 
suggest that cohorts with an "equality of misery" are likely to engage in political violence. 
EXPLAINING VIOLENCE AFTER THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT 
While there is undoubtedly merit to the claim that acts of sectarian violence generate more 
violence in response, the sociopolitical theory fails to address the immediate conditions that will be 
most likely to ignite violent action and, consequently, leaves policymakers with few opportunities to 
respond to the problem. In contrast, relative deprivation theory suggests that sectarian violence 
occurs not because the groups are too different to peacefully coexist but rather because they are 
experiencing a common problem. If high unemployment is truly the underlying cause of civil unrest, 
64 Blackaby et a1. 2007 
65 Maney 2005 
66 Maney 2005; \'V'hite 1993 
67 Honaker 2004 
68 Blackaby et al. 2007 
69 Beatty 2013 
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then policymakers have a greater capacity to handle the problem or at the very least to pursue 
policies that may help them do so. 
The United Kingdom has been investing in projects to improve the economy of Northern 
Ireland for years, believing that a reduction in unemployment would lead to a reduction in political 
violence throughout the country.70 The focus of this research will be determining the extent to 
which the unemployment rate has affected political violence in the fifteen years following the 
Troubles. If a strong relationship between the variables can be determined, then the continuing 
support for economic initiatives as political violence deterrents can be more readily justified. Based 
on the narrowing unemployment gap between the ethnonationalist groups and the assumptions of 
the relative deprivation theory, the following hypothesis was proposed: As the unemployment rate 
increases, the number of politically motivated acts of violence will also increase. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
In order to test this hypothesis, the present study utilized multiple regression models to 
analyze statistics collected by the Northern Irish government. Quarterly unemployment data from 
the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment of Northern Ireland was used to measure the 
main independent variable, the unemployment rate. Because it is widely acknowledged that 
participants in political violence tend to be young and male,7! separate regression equations were run 
controlling for age and gender in order to determine whether or not unemployment for those 
particular groups had an effect on the level of political violence. In order to rule out potential 
intervening variables, the model also controlled for both Regional GDHI and political attitudes over 
time. The measurement of political attitudes utilized three categories: Unionist, Nationalist, and 
Other, Neither, or Don't Know, 72 
The dependent variable, political violence, was measured using data collected by the Police 
Service of Northern Ireland (pSNI). Specifically, this study utilized statistics taken from the PSNI 
Security Situation report. I combined the total number of violent incidents per quarter in four 
different categories of violent action into an aggregate total to get a clearer picture of how the level of 
political violence varied over the fifteen-year period covered by the study. The categories included in 
the aggregate measure are as follows: paramilitary style shootings, paramilitary style assaults, bombing 
incidents related to the Security Situation, and shooting incidents related to the Security Situation. In 
the time period included in this study, there were a total of 6,328 incidents. The use of this relatively 
narrow definition of Security Situation-related violence rather than a broader study of sectarian crime 
70 Hewitt 1984 
71 Hayes and McAllister 2005 
72 After initially controlling for religious affiliation, I ultimately d ecided to omit that variable from my mod el 
d ue to a lack of variation over time. 
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allowed me to ensure that the incidents studied had an underl)�ng political motivation and were not 
purely acts of ethnic hatred. 
DATA AND ANALYSIS 
My results have led me to reject my hypothesis that the unemployment rate has an effect on 
political violence in Northern Ireland. For every category that I analyzed-regardless of time lag, 
age group, or gender controls-the unemployment rate did not have a significant relationship with 
the level of political violence in Northern Ireland in the post-Good Friday Agreement period. The 
consistency of these fmdings strongly refutes the possibility of a causal relationship between my 
independent and dependent variables. 
It is worth noting that the unemployment rate might not completely capture the 
employment situation in Northern Ireland. The unemployment rate is a percentage equal to the 
number of unemployed individuals divided by the number of workers participating in the labor 
force. The labor force is the sum of employed and unemployed workers, not the total working-age 
population. Therefore, the unemployment rate excludes so-called "discouraged workers"­
individuals who have been unemployed for so long that they are no longer searching for work and 
have dropped out of the labor force. It may well be that the long-term unemployed and 
discouraged workers are more likely to have politically-motivated grievances and to act more 
violently than those individuals who are included in the total unemployment rate. This is a 
possibility that should be taken into account in future research on this matter. 
Despite the absence of a relationship between political violence and the unemployment rate, 
the relative deprivation theory still appears to hold true for the period under study. Another 
economic indicator-Gross Domestic Household Income-showed a significant negative 
correlation with political violence in each of the six models considered.73 The U.K. Office for 
National Statistics defined the GDHI as "the amount of money left available \vithin the household 
sector for spending or saving, after expenditure associated with income, for example, taxes and 
social contributions, property ownership and provision for future pension income. It is calculated 
gross of any deductions for capital consumption." The regression models used in this study 
showed that as the total GDHI increases by £1 billion, the total number of Security Situation­
related incidents decreased by between twenty-four and twenty-nine incidents, depending on the 
other variables used in the model. Each of these correlations was statistically significant at the 
0.001 level, indicating that there is an extremely small likelihood that the relationship occurred by 
73 Significant results are ind icated on the tables by und erlining. For all results, * ind icates that the result is 
significant at the 0.10 level, ** ind icates that the result is significant at the 0.05 level, and *** ind icates that the 
result is significant at the 0.001 level. 
chance. While unemployment itself does not appear to influence the level of violence, income and 
other economic factors almost certainly make a contribution. 
Shifts in political beliefs also appear to be influencing the level of political violence in 
Northern Ireland. In Model 3, which utilized a one-quarter unemployment rate lag, the results 
indicated that a one percentage point increase in the number of people reporting a Unionist political 
affiliation led to roughly nine fewer Security Situation incidents. Model 4 indicates an eight incident 
increase for every one percentage point increase in the proportion of respondents identifying as 
Nationalists and a fourteen incident increase for every one percentage point increase in the 
proportion of those not affiliating with either party. The other models showed similar patterns. 
These results are inconsistent with the idea that the political divide between Unionists and 
Republicans is the cause of violence and the data show that an increase in nonaffiliated individuals 
is a contributing factor. 
While the increase in violence corresponding with an increase in the percentage of 
respondents identifying as Republican-the group that has historically been involved in rebellious 
activities-seems to make logical sense, the fact that an increase in Unionist affiliation leads to a 
decrease in paramilitary violence is somewhat puzzling. It might be posited that Unionists are less 
likely in the post-Good Friday Agreement period to participate in paramilitary acts of violence than 
are Republicans, but the raw data refute this claim. Since 1998, Loyalists have been responsible for 
685 of the 1,181 paramilitary style shootings reported in Northern Ireland through the final quarter 
of 2012, compared to the 496 such shootings carried out by Republicans. With respect to 
Paramilitary Style assaults, Loyalists were behind 948 of the 1,412 incidents, whereas Republicans 
were responsible for 464. The cause of these discrepancies is a subject that deserves further study 
in the future. 
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Regression Modell: Percent Unionist 
M dI S o e 
Model 
1 
ummary 
R 
.698 
Coefficients 
(Constant) 
R Sguare 
.487 
Unemployment Rate All Persons 
Total GDHI (£ Billions) 
Political Beliefs Percent Other/ 
Neither/Don't Know 
Political Beliefs: Percent Unionist 
Adjusted R Std. Error of 
Square the Estimate 
.443 55.82 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
B Std. Error t 
808.57 250.04 3.23 
-10.40 8.66 -1.20 
-25.75*** 6.84 -3.76 
5.06 5.22 .97 
-8.79** 4.09 -2.15 
Regression Model 2: Percent Nationalist 
M d I S  1 0 e 
Model 
2 
ummary 
R 
.688 
Coefficients 
(Constant) 
R Sguare 
.473 
Unemployment Rate All Persons 
Total GDHI (£ Billions) 
Political Beliefs Percent Other/ 
Neither/Don't Know 
Percent Nationalist 
Adjusted R Std. Error of 
Sguare the Estimate 
.428 56.57 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
B Std. Error t 
-43.19 227.18 -.19 
-9.53 8.81 -1.08 
-24.51 *** 6.85 -3.58 
12.84* 6.71 1.91 
7.99* 4.42 1.81 
Sig. 
.002 
.236 
.000 
.337 
.037 
Sig. 
.850 
.285 
.001 
.062 
.077 
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Regression Model 3: Percent Unionist, Lagged One Quarter Unemployment Rate 
M d I S  o e ummary 
Adjusted R Std. Error of 
Model R R Square Square the Estimate 
3 .710 .504 .461 55.45 
Coefficients 
Unstandarclized Coefficients 
B Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant) 836.11 254.24 3.29 .002 
Lagged lQ Unemployment Rate -12.27 9.47 -1.30 .202 All Persons 
Total GDHI (£ Billions) -27.77*** 7.13 -3.90 .000 
Political Beliefs Percent Other/ 5.74 5.19 1.10 .275 Neither/Don't Know 
Percent Unionist -8.86** 4.05 -2.19 .034 
Regression Model 4: Percent Nationalist, Lagged One Quarter Unemployment Rate 
M dI S o e ummary 
Adjusted R Std. Error of 
Model R R Square Square the Estimate 
4 .699 .489 .445 56.29 
Coefficients 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
B Std. Error t Sig. 
(Constant) -21.38 223.83 -.10 .924 
Lagged 1 Q Unemployment Rate -11.56 9.71 -1.19 .240 All Persons 
Total GDHI (£ Billions) -26.50*** 7.17 -3.70 .001 
Political Beliefs Percent Other/ 13.59** 6.69 2.03 .048 Neither/Don't Know 
Percent Nationalist 8.02* 4.42 1.81 .076 
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Regression ModelS: Percent Unionist, Lagged One Year Unemployment Rate 
M diS o e ummary 
Model R 
5 .737 
Coefficients 
(Constant) 
R Square 
.543 
Lagged lYear Unemployment 
Rate All Persons 
Total GDHI (j, Billions) 
Political Beliefs Percent Other/ 
Neither/Don't Know 
Percent Unionist 
Adjusted R Std. Error of 
Square the Estimate 
.501 54.48 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
B Std. Error t Sig. 
739.58 236.12 3.13 .003 
-6.34 10.19 -.62 .536 
-28.50*** 7.09 -4.02 .000 
6.04 5.03 1.20 .236 
-6.98* 3.72 -1.88 .067 
Regression Model 6: Percent Nationalist, Lagged One Year Unemployment Rate 
M diS o e ummary 
Model R 
6 .725 
Coefficients 
(Constant) 
R Square 
.526 
Lagged lYear Unemployment 
Rate All Persons 
Total GDHI (j, Billions) 
Political Beliefs Percent Other/ 
Neither/Don't Know 
Percent Nationalist 
Adjusted R Std. Error of 
Square the Estimate 
.481 55.53 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
B Std. Error T Sig. 
111.40 229.98 .48 .631 
-6.77 10.40 -.65 .519 
-27.53*** 7.19 -3.83 .000 
11.69* 5.82 2.01 .051 
5.43 4.06 1.34 .187 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The results of this study have important implications for policymakers not only on the 
island of Ireland but also in other areas of intense ethnic conflict. The statistical insignificance of 
the unemployment rate on political violence may suggest that if the u.K. and Irish governments' 
priority is the reduction of violent activity, policies aimed at increasing household income would be 
more effective than efforts that specifically target lowering the unemployment rate. However, if 
further research indicates that persistent structural unemployment is related to political violence, this 
finding would strengthen the argument for government initiatives aimed at educating and training 
prospective workers. According to T.D. Joe McHugh, Chairman of the Joint Commitree on the 
Implementation of the Good Friday Agreement, current economic approaches to decreasing 
violence focus on funding grassroots programs combating youth unemployment. He stated in a 
press release this past September, "We are acutely aware that education and employment 
opportunities often elude many young people in Northern Ireland and the border region. As such, a 
focus on funding to assist in informal and formal education is to be welcomed."74 While the data 
fail to show any causal relationship between the unemployment rate and political violence, 
policymakers continue to act under the assumption that the two are related. Although a reduction in 
unemployment benefits society as a whole and is a worthwhile policy initiative, if both governments 
intend to reduce political violence, it would appear that an alternative approach would be more 
effective. 
One alternative would be shifting the focus to policies promoting the growth of individuals' 
household incomes. The strong negative correlation between GDHI and political violence provides 
empirical evidence for the link between economic wellbeing and the level of political violence. This 
in turn suggests that policies stressing economic development, particularly for communities, have 
the potential to lower the rates of violence. Policymakers could use this evidence as justification for 
their economic growth initiatives, which currently receive immense amounts of funding both from 
the U.K. and the EU. 
Notable among these initiatives is the EU Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in 
Northern Ireland and the Border Region of Ireland (the PEACE Programme). In the proposed 
2020 EU budget, €150 million was set aside to continue the PEACE Programme in addition to the 
€50 million already earmarked by the U.K." According to EU Commissioner for Regional Policy 
Johannes Hahn, the success of the PEACE Programme has already drawn the attention of Russia, 
Palestine, the Balkans, Colombia, and South Korea, countries that are seeking effective 
74 Oireachtas 2013 
75 Oireachtas 2013 
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reconciliation models.76 The evidence presented in this study suggests that such emulation has the 
potential to be highly effective in reducing politically motivated violence. This is a possibility that 
international economic organizations should consider when determining how to allocate 
development funds. 
As Northern Ireland continues to come to terms \vith its troubled past, preventing the 
resurgence of ethnic violence will continue to be of the utmost importance. In light of the empirical 
evidence of this study, there can be little doubt that the establishment of a solid economic 
foundation is critical to the maintenance of peace not only in this region but in other conflict areas 
as well. The need for the government to continue monitoring and promoting this stability should 
not be underestimated. Though Northern Ireland has undoubtedly made iucredible progress in the 
past fifteen years, the continued presence of paramilitary actors cautions agaiust the possibility of 
complacency on this matter. 
76 "Northern Ireland: The Peace Programme" 2013 
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